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Abstract
We explore how different proof orderings induce different notions of saturation and com-
pleteness. We relate completion, paramodulation, saturation, redundancy elimination, and
rewrite system reduction to proof orderings.
They are not capable to ground a canonicity of universal consistency.
—Alexandra Deligiorgi (ΠAI∆EIA, 1998)
1 Introduction
We define the canonical basis of an abstract deductive system in three distinct ways:
(1) Formulæ appearing in minimal proofs; (2) non-redundant lemmata; (3) mini-
mal trivial theorems. Well-founded orderings of proofs [1] are used to distinguish
between cheap “direct” proofs, those that are of a computational flavor (e.g. rewrite
proofs), and expensive “indirect” proofs, those that require search to find. This ap-
proach suggests generalizations of the concepts of “redundancy” and “saturation”,
as elaborated by Nieuwenhuis and Rubio in [10]. Saturated, for us, means that all
cheap proofs are supported. By considering different orderings on proofs, one gets
different kinds of saturated sets.
This work continues the development of an abstract theory of “canonical infer-
ence”, initiated in [8], and which grew out of the theory of rewriting (see [9,13]).
Although we will use ground equations as an illustrative example, the framework
applies equally well in the first-order setting, whether equational or clausal (such
as [7]). Though our motivation is primarily æsthetic; our expectation is that some
practical applications will follow.
1 This research was supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 254/01).
2 Email: Nachumd@tau.ac.il
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2 Proof Systems
Let A be the set of all formulæ (ground equations and disequations, in our ex-
amples) over some fixed vocabulary. Let P be the set of all (ground equational)
proofs. These sets are linked by two functions: Γ : P! 2A gives the assumptions
in a proof, and ∆ : P! A gives its conclusion. Both are extended to sets of proofs
in the usual fashion. (We assume for simplicity that proofs use only a finite number
of assumptions.)
The framework proposed here is predicated on two well-founded partial order-
ings over P: a proof ordering  and a subproof relation . They are related by
a monotonicity requirement given below (8). We assume for convenience that the
proof ordering only compares proofs with the same conclusion (p q)∆ p=∆q),
rather than mention this condition each time we have cause to compare proofs.
We will use the term presentation to mean a set of formulæ, and justification to
mean a set of proofs. We reserve the term theory for deductively closed presenta-
tions. Let A denote the theory of presentation A, that is, the set of conclusions of
all proofs with assumptions A:
A := ∆ Γ 1A = f∆ p : p 2 P; Γ p = Ag(1)
We assume the following three standard properties of Tarskian consequence rela-
tions:
A  (A[B)(2)
A  A(3)
A = A(4)
Thus, - is a closure operation. It follows from (2) that
A = f∆ p : p 2 P; Γ p Ag(5)
We say that presentation A is a basis for theory C if A =C. Presentations A and B
are equivalent if their theories are identical: A = B.
As a very simple running example, let the vocabulary consist of the constant 0
and unary symbol s. Abbreviate tally terms si0 as numeral i. The set A consists of
all unordered equations i= j; so symmetry is built into the structure of proofs. (We
postpone dealing with disequations for the time being.) An equational inference
system (with this vocabulary) might consist of the following five inference rules:

0 = 0
Z
i = j
i = j
Ii= j
i = j j = k
i = k
T
i = j
si = s j
S
a c
c
P
where Z is an (assumptionless) axiom, I introduces assumptions, and S infers i+
1 = j+ 1 from a proof of i = j. Proof tree branches of the transitivity rule T are
unordered. Projection P allows irrelevant assumptions to be ignored and is needed
to accommodate monotonicity (2).
For example, if A= f4= 2;4= 0g, then A= fi= j : i j (mod 2)g. Consider
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the proof schemata:

0 = 0
1 = 1
.
.
.
i = i
4= 2
4= 2
5 = 3
.
.
.
i+4 = i+2
4= 0
4= 0
4= 2
4= 2
2 = 0
.
.
.
i  j 2 = 0
i  j 1 = 1
i  j = 2
i  j = 0
.
.
.
i = j
Let’s use proof terms for proofs, denoting the above three trees by p = S iZ,
q= S iI(4;2), and r = S jT (T (I(4;0); I(4;2));SS(  )), respectively. Thus, Γ p= /0,
Γq = f4 = 2g, and ∆r is the formula i = j.
With a recursive path ordering [6] to order proofs, precedence Z < S < T < I <
P < 0 < 1 < 2 <   , and multiset “status” for I, the minimal proof of a theorem in
A takes one of the forms
S j (∇4k=0) S j (∇4k=2)
The subproofs ∇4k=0 and ∇4k=2 are defined recursively:
∇0=0 = Z ∇0=2 = T (∇4=0;∇4=2)
∇4=0 = I(4;0) ∇4(k+1)=0 = T (S 4k∇4=0;∇4k=0)
∇4=2 = I(4;2) ∇4(k+1)=2 = S2T (∇0=2;S2∇4k=0)
We call a proof trivial when it proves only itself and has no subproofs other
than itself, that is, if Γ p = f∆ pg and p q ) p = q. We denote by ba such a
trivial proof of a 2 A and by bA the set of trivial proofs of each a 2 A. For example,
d4=0 = I(4;0).
We assume that proofs use their assumptions (6), that subproofs don’t use non-
existent assumptions (7), and that proof orderings are monotonic with respect to
subproofs (8). Specifically, for all proofs p;q;r and formulæ a:
a 2 Γ p ) p ba(6)
pq ) Γ p Γq(7)
pq > r ) 9v 2 P: p > v r(8)
We make no other assumptions regarding proofs or their structure.
Postulate (8) is the most significant for the development that follows. It states
that > (which we have restricted to proofs with the same conclusion) and  com-
mute. Symbolically: Æ> >Æ. In other words, “replacing” a subproof q of a
proof p with a smaller proof r “results” in a proof v that is smaller than the original
p. All proof orderings in the literature obey this monotonicity requirement.
Every formula a admits a trivial proof ba by (3,6). Let Σp = fq : p qg denote
the subproofs of p, and likewise ΣP = [p2PΣp. This way, (6) can be abbreviated
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cΓ p  Σp. On account of (6,8), proofs are also monotonic with respect to any
inessential assumptions they refer to, should the latter admit smaller than trivial
proofs.
It may be convenient to think of a proof-tree “leaf” as a subproof with only
itself as a subproof; other subproofs are the “internal nodes”. There are two kinds
of leaves: trivial proofs ba (such as inferences I), and vacuous proofs a¯ with Γ a¯= /0
and ∆ a¯ = a (such as Z). By well-foundedness of , there are no infinite “paths”
in proof trees. It follows from (8) that the transitive closure of > [ is also well-
founded.
3 Canonical Systems
Denote the set of all proofs using assumptions of A by:
ΠA := fp 2 P : Γ p Ag
and define the minimal proofs in a set of proofs as:
µP := fp 2 P : :9q 2 P: q < pg
On account of well-foundedness, minimal proofs always exist.
Note that Γ , ∆ , , and Π are all monotonic with respect to set inclusion, but µΠ
is not.
Proposition 3.1 For all justifications P:
P  ΠΓP(9)
And for all presentations A;B:
ΓΠA = A(10)
ΣµΠA = µΠA(11)
ΠA= ΠB , A= B(12)
Proof. Inclusion (9) follows from the definitions, as does one direction of (10).
That A ΓΠA, is a consequence of reflexivity (3). Equality (11) is a consequence
of (8). The interesting direction of (12) follows immediately from (10) and mono-
tonicity of Γ . 2
Lemma 3.2
µQ P ^ µP Q , µP= µQ
Proof. The right-to-left direction is easy. For the other, suppose p 2 µP. By as-
sumption, p 2Q. Consider any q 2 µQ such that q p. By assumption, q is also in
P. But p is minimal in P. Hence, p= q 2 µQ. 2
We say that presentation A is reduced when A= ΓµΠA. Our main definition is:
Definition 3.3 [Canonical Presentation] The canonical presentation contains those
formulæ that appear as assumptions of minimal proofs, allowing as assumptions
any lemma of the theory:
A] := ΓµΠA
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So, we will say that A is canonical if A= A].
Proof orderings are lifted to sets of proofs, as follows:
Definition 3.4 Justification Q is better than justification P if:
Pw Q : 8p 2 P:9q 2 Q: p q
It is much better if:
PA Q : 8p 2 P:9q 2 Q: p > q
Justifications are similar if:
P' Q : Pw Qw P
Recall that only proofs with the same conclusion are comparable by the proof or-
dering .
Transitivity of these three relations follows from the definitions. They are com-
patible: wÆAA,wÆ'w, etc. Since it is also reflexive,w is a quasi-ordering.
Proposition 3.5 For all justifications P;Q:
P w µP(13)
Pw Q , µPw µQ(14)
PA Q , µPA µQ(15)
P' Q , µP= µQ(16)
Proof. Well-foundedness ensures that minimal proofs exist (13). Suppose P w Q.
Trivially, µP w P; by (13), Q w µQ; so µP w µQ. For the other direction of (14):
P w µP w µQ w Q. Equivalence (15) is similar. For (16), suppose p 2 µP ' µQ.
There must be q 2 µQ and p0 2 µP such that p  q  p0. Since p is minimal,
p= p0 = q 2 µQ. By symmetry, µP= µQ. 2
Proposition 3.6 The relation w is a partial ordering of minimal proofs.
Proof. By (16). 2
This “better than” quasi-ordering on proofs is lifted to a “simpler than” quasi-
ordering on (equivalent) sets of formulæ, as follows:
Definition 3.7 Presentation B is said to be simpler than an equivalent presentation
A when B provides better proofs than does A:
A% B : A = B^ ΠAwΠB
Presentations are similar if their proofs are:
A B : ΠA'ΠB
These relations are also compatible.
Proposition 3.8 For all presentations A;B:
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ΠA w Π(A[B)(17)
µΠA = µΠB , A B(18)
A B^A = B ) A% B(19)
A B^ΠBwΠA ) A B(20)
Proof. Line (17) is a consequence of the monotonicity of Π; (18) is a direct con-
sequence of (16); and (19) is a consequence of (17) and the definitions. If A  B
and ΠB w ΠA, as on the left of (20), then ΠA ' ΠB, again by (17). Hence, their
theories are the same, and, by definition, A B. 2
Proposition 3.9 The relation % is a quasi-ordering and  is its associated equiv-
alence relation.
The function ] is “canonical” with respect to equivalence of presentations. That
is: A] = A; A = B, A] = B]; and A]] = A]. This justifies the terminology of
Definition 3.3.
We conclude this section by showing that the canonical presentation is indeed
the simplest:
Lemma 3.10 A% A].
Proof. By (10), A] = ΓµΠA  ΓΠA = A. Thus, µΠA] ΠA] ΠA. Also, by
(9), µΠA  ΠΓµΠA = µΠA]  ΠA]. By Lemma 3.2, µΠA] = µΠA, so ΠA w
µΠA = µΠA] w ΠA]. In other words, A % A]. By (3) and (17), we have A% A,
so we are done. 2
4 Saturated Systems
By a “normal-form proof”, we mean a proof in µΠA, the minimal proofs allowing
any theorem as a lemma. Recall (8) that all subproofs of normal-form proofs are
also in normal form. We propose the following definitions:
Definition 4.1 [Saturation] A presentation A is saturated if it supports all possible
normal form proofs:
ΠA µΠA
Definition 4.2 [Completeness] A presentation A is complete if every theorem has
a normal form proof:
A = ∆(ΠA\µΠA)
A presentation is complete if it is saturated, but for the converse, we need a
further hypothesis: minimal proofs are unique if for all theorems c 2 ΠA there is
exactly one minimal proof in µΠA with conclusion c. In particular, this holds for
proof orderings that are total (on proofs of the same theorem).
Proposition 4.3 If minimal proofs are unique, then a presentation is saturated iff
it is complete.
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For example, suppose all rewrite (valley) proofs are minimal but incomparable.
Then any Church-Rosser system is complete, since every identity has a rewrite prof,
but only the full deductive closure is saturated.
It follows from Lemma 3.2 that:
Lemma 4.4 A presentation is saturated iff
µΠA= µΠA
Theorem 4.5 ([8]) A presentation A is saturated iff it contains its own canonical
presentation: A  A]. In particular, A] is saturated. Moreover, the canonical pre-
sentation A] is the smallest saturated set: No equivalent proper subset of A] is
saturated; if A is saturated, then every equivalent superset also is.
Corollary 4.6 Presentation A is saturated iff A  A.
Proof. It is always the case that A % A % A]. If A is saturated, then A  A] and,
therefore, A % A] % A. For the other direction, suppose p 2 µΠA. Since A is
similar, there must be a proof q 2 ΠA  ΠA, such that q  p. But q 6< p, so
p 2ΠA. It follows that µΠA ΠA, and A is saturated. 2
Corollary 4.7 Similar presentations are either both saturated or neither is.
Lemma 4.8 Similar presentations are either both complete or neither is.
Proof. First note that for any two justifications P  Q, it is always the case that
P\ µQ  µP. So, in general, for any presentation A, we have ΠA\ µΠA  µΠA
and ΠA\µΠA = µΠA\µΠA.
Now, if A B, then, by definition, B = A, and, by (18), µΠA= µΠB. So, if A
is complete, we get:
B = A = ∆(ΠA\µΠA) = ∆(µΠA\µΠA)
= ∆(µΠB\µΠB) = ∆(ΠB\µΠB)
2
Formulæ that can be removed from a presentation—without making proofs
worse—are “redundant”:
Definition 4.9 [Redundancy] A set R of formulæ is (globally) redundant with re-
spect to a presentation A when:
A[R% AnR
The set of all (locally) redundant formulæ of a given presentation A will be denoted
as follows:
ρA := fr 2 A : A% Anfrgg
A presentation A is irredundant if
ρA = /0
126
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Proposition 4.10 ([8]) The following facts hold for all presentations A:
ρA] = /0(21)
A  AnρA(22)
A] = A nρA(23)
A] = ∆(µΠA\cA)(24)
bA] = µΠA\cA(25)
It is thanks to well-foundedness of > that the set of all locally redundant for-
mulæ in ρA is globally redundant (Eq. 22). Thus, it can be shown that A is reduced
iff it is irredundant. The alternate definition of the canonical set (24) is made pos-
sible by the properties of subproofs. For details, see [8].
Theorem 4.11 A presentation is canonical iff it is saturated and reduced.
Proof. One direction follows immediately from Theorem 4.5 and (21). For the
other direction, let A be saturated and reduced. We aim to show that A = A]. By
Lemma 3.10, A % A] and the two presentations are equivalent. If A is saturated,
then by Theorem 4.5, A  A]. By (19), for any r 2 A nA], A % A] % A n frg. But
ρA = /0, since A is reduced, so it cannot be that r 2 A. In other words, A nA] = /0,
and A is canonical. 2
Returning to our simple example, we can add three inference rules for disequal-
ities:
i = j j 6= k
i 6= k
T
i 6= i
j = k
F j=k
i 6= j
i 6= j
Ii 6= j
With them, one can infer, for example, 0 6= 0 from 1 6= 1. If F is smaller than other
proof combinators, and I nodes are incomparable, then the canonical basis of any
inconsistent set is fi 6= j : i; j 2 Ng. All positive equations are redundant.
5 Variations
Consider the above inference rules for ground equality and disequality: S;T;F; I;Z,
with S extended to apply to all function symbols of any arity. Suppose we are using
something like the recursive path ordering for proof terms.
Refutation.
If the inference rule F is the cheapest in the proof ordering, T < I, and I(i; j)
nodes are measured by the values of i and j, then the canonical basis of any incon-
sistent presentation is a (smallest) trivial disequation ft 6= tg.
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Deduction.
If the proof ordering prefers introduction I of assumptions over all other in-
ferences (including Z), then trivial proofs are best. In that case, ρA = /0 and the
canonical basis includes the whole theory A] = A.
Paramodulation.
If the proof ordering makes functional reflexivity S smaller than I, but the
only ordering on leaves is I(u; t)  I(c[u];c[t]) for any context c, then the
canonical basis will be the congruence closure, as generated by paramodulation:
ρA = f f (u1; : : : ;un) = f (t1; : : : ; tn) : u1 = t1; : : : ;un = tn 2 Ag. The theory A is
the closure under functional reflexivity of the basis A]. If A is as in our first exam-
ple, then A] = f2 j = 0 : j > 0g.
Completion.
On the other hand, if the ordering on leaves compares terms in some simplifica-
tion ordering, then the canonical basis will be the fully reduced set, as generated
by (ground) completion: ρA = fu = ug[fu = t : t = v 2 A; t  v; v is not ug.
For our first example, A] = f2 = 0g. For another example, if A = fa = c;sa = bg
and sa  sb  sc  a  b  c, then I(sa;b) > T (S(I(a;c)); I(sc;b)), and hence
A] = fa = c;sc = bg.
Superposition.
If one distinguishes between T steps based on the weight of the shared term j,
making T > I when j is the smallest, and T < I otherwise, then the canonical basis
is also closed under paramodulation into the larger side of equations.
6 Derivations
Theorem proving with simplification (cf. [7]) entails two processes: Expansion,
whereby any sound deductions (anything in E ) may be added to the set of derived
theorems; and Contraction, whereby any redundancies (anything in ρE) may be
removed.
A sequence of presentations E0 ; E1 ;    is called a derivation. Let E =
[iEi. The result of the derivation is, as usual [1], its persisting formulæ:
E∞ := liminfj!∞ E j
We say that a proof p persists when Γ p  E∞. Thus, if a proof persists, so do its
subproofs (by 7). By (17), we have ΠEi wΠE.
Definition 6.1 A derivation E0; E1;    is good if Ei % Ei+1 for all i.
We are only interested in good derivations. From here on in, only good deriva-
tions will be considered. It is easy to see that:
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Lemma 6.2 Derivations, the steps of which are expansions and contractions, are
good.
Proposition 6.3 If a derivation is good, then the limit supports the best proofs:
E

 E∞.
Proof. One direction, namely ΠE∞wΠE, follows by (17) from the fact that E∞
E

. To establish that ΠE

w ΠE∞, we show that µΠE w ΠE∞ and rely on (13).
Suppose p 2 µΠE

. It follows from (6,11) that cΓ p  Σp  µΠE

 µΠE

. By
goodness, each a2 Γ p persists from some Ei on. Hence, Γ pE∞, and p2ΠE∞.2
Definition 6.4 A good derivation is fair if C(E∞) A ΠE where C(E) is the set of
critical proof obligations:
C(E) := fp 2ΠE : p =2 µΠE; 8q p: q 2 µΠEg(26)
It is clean if ρE

\E∞ = /0.
Critical obligations are proofs that are not in normal form but all of whose
proper subproofs are already in normal form. Fairness means that all persistent
obligations are eventually “subsumed” by a strictly smaller proof.
Lemma 6.5 If a derivation is clean, then its limit is reduced.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that some r 2 ρE∞  E∞  E. Consider br, and
compare it to a smaller proof p 2 ΠE∞. Let A = Γ p  E∞  E. Let q 2 µΠE.
Were r 2 Γq, then replacing br as a subproof of q with p, would by (8) result in a
smaller proof than q. It follows that r 2 ρE

, which contradicts cleanliness. 2
Lemma 6.6 If a derivation is fair, then its limit is complete.
Proof. Any presentation A is complete if ΠA w ΠA\ µΠA, since a 2 A implies
a 2 ∆(ΠA\ µΠA), whence completeness. Let A = E

be all formulæ proved at
any stage in the derivation. We show that A is complete in the above manner.
Completeness of E∞ follows from Lemma 4.8. Consider any proof in p 2ΠA of a.
Let p∞ 2ΠE∞ ΠA be the persisting proof of a, for which p∞  p by the previous
proposition. If p∞ 2 µΠA, we’re done. Otherwise, p∞ has a minimal (with respect
to) non-normal-form (possibly trivial) subproof q, all subproofs of which (persist
and) are in normal form. By fairness, there is a proof r 2 ΠA of the same theorem
as q such that p∞q > r. By (8), there is therefore a better proof p0 < p∞  p. By
induction, there is a p00  p0 in both ΠA and µΠA, also proving a. 2
For example, suppose a proof ordering makes bc > aˆ
c
and cˆ
a
> ba. Start with E0 =
fcg, and consider bc. Were bc to persist, then by fairness a better proof would evolve,
the better proof being aˆ
c
. If ba is in normal form, then a 2 E∞ and both minimal
proofs persist. Another example: µP = fba;bc; aˆ
c
g and E = fag, then E ; E ;   
is fair, since E∞ = E and C(E∞) = /0. The result is complete but unsaturated (c is
missing).
Together, these lemmata and Proposition 4.3 yield:
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Theorem 6.7 If minimal proofs are unique and a derivation is fair and clean, then
its limit is canonical.
By (24), this also means that each e 2 E∞ is its own ultimate proof be, so is not
susceptible to contraction.
Returning to our main example, if projection P is the most expensive type of
inference, then no minimal proof includes it. And if proofs are compared in a
simplification ordering (subproofs are always smaller than their superproofs), then
minimal proofs will never have superfluous transitivity inferences of the form
u= t t = t
u= t
T
Let  be a total simplification-ordering of terms, let P > I > T > S > Z in the
precedence, let proofs be greater than terms, and compare proof trees in the cor-
responding total recursive path simplification-ordering. Ground completion is an
inference mechanism consisting of the following inference rules:
Deduce: E [fw= t[u]g ; E [fw = t[v]g if u = v 2 E
and u v
Delete: E [ft = tg ; E
Furthermore, operationally, completion implements these inferences “fairly”: No
persistently enabled inference rule is ignored forever.
Corollary 6.8 (Completeness of Completion) Ground completion results—at the
limit—in the canonical, Church-Rosser basis: E∞ = E]0.
Proof. Ground completion is good, since Deduce and Delete don’t increase proofs
(;%). In particular, I(w; t[u])> T (I(w; t[v]);Sn(I(u;v))) if u  v, since t[u]
t[v] and t[u]  u  v. Ground completion is fair and clean. For example, the
critical obligation
w = t t = v
w = v
T
when t w;v, is resolved by Deduce. Also, since T > S, non-critical cases resolve
naturally:
w = t
f w = f t
t = v
f t = f v
f w = f v
>
w = t t = v
w = v
f w = f v
2
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7 Discussion
We have suggested here that proof orderings, rather than formula orderings, take
center stage in theorem proving with contraction (simplification and deletion of for-
mulæ). Given a proof ordering that distinguishes “good proofs” from “bad proofs”,
it makes sense to define completeness of a set of formulæ as the claim that all theo-
rems enjoy a smallest (“best”) proof. Then an inference system is complete if it has
the ability to generate all formulæ needed for such ideal proofs. Given a formula
ordering, one can, of course, choose to compare proofs by simply comparing the
multiset of their assumptions.
We defined both saturation and redundancy in terms of the proof ordering. This
appears to be flexible, since it allows small proofs to use large assumptions. The
definition of redundancy in [2], namely, that an inference is redundant if its con-
clusion can be inferred from smaller formulæ, coincides with ours when proofs are
measured first by their maximal assumption. Our definition accords with the one
given by Bonacina and Hsiang in [5, Def. 3.3]—a sentence is redundant if adding it
to the set of assumptions does not decrease any minimal proof. (See [4, Chap. 2].)
The notion of “saturation” in theorem proving, in which superfluous deductions
are not necessary for completeness, was suggested by Rusinowitch [11, pp. 99–
100] in the context of a Horn-clause resolution calculus. In our terminology: A
presentation was said to be saturated when all inferrible formulæ are syntactically
subsumed by formulæ in the presentation. (See also [12].) This concept was refined
by Bachmair and Ganzinger [2,3] and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio [10, pp. 29–42].
The more recent works likewise deem a set saturated if every possible inference is
redundant, but use the more general notions of redundancy.
In [1], a completion sequence is deemed fair if all persistent critical inferences
are generated. In [10, fn. 8], an inference sequence is held to be fair if all persistent
inferences are either generated or become redundant. The definition of fairness
propounded here combines the two ideas. But fairness only earns completeness,
not saturation. (A stronger version of fairness is needed for saturation when the
proof ordering is partial.) Our definition of critical obligations also allows one to
incorporate “critical pair criteria”.
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